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In July 2012, in an internal document, the European Commission’s Directorate-General for 
Trade suggested that future EU investment agreements (EUIAs) should incorporate 
regulatory flexibility in the same way in which EU free trade agreements (FTAs) safeguard 
parties’ policy space. Since it is expected that a number of treaties on the EU’s negotiating 
agenda will be concluded in the near future, and given the policy shift that has already taken 
place in Canada and the US,1 it is time to start thinking about a new balance in a move away 
from investment treaties’ traditional laissez-faire liberalism toward WTO law’s embedded 
liberalism,2 a model whereby liberalization is embedded within a wider framework that 
enables public regulation in the interest of domestic stability. 3 
 
Investment agreements -- most particularly European bilateral investment treaties (BITs) --
contain some of the last vestiges of international economic law’s laissez-faire liberalism. In 
contrast with trade agreements, European investment treaties tend to be short documents, 
single-mindedly focused on investment protection and displaying stubborn laconism where 
the public interest is concerned. France, Germany and the Netherlands -- among Europe’s 
most prolific investment treaty negotiators -- rarely digress from this approach, as 
exemplified by their model BITs. 
 
But, the wind of change is slowly shaking things up. 
 
First, until recently the right to regulate was almost exclusively encountered in UNCTAD and 
(less frequently) OECD publications. Although it has essentially been a taboo phrase in more 
economically liberal circles, it has entered the investment negotiation vocabulary. Recent 
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developments have signalled the need for change, underlined by Latin American withdrawals 
from the investment law system, an impeding termination of South African BITs and the 
Australian Government’s rejection of investor-state dispute settlement, a policy currently also 
pursued by Australia in the context of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. Most 
crucially, this concern for regulatory space was made explicit, as early as 2004, with the US 
and Canadian Model BIT revisions, and has been confirmed and mildly strengthened with the 
US Model BIT of 2012. 
 
Disillusionment with investment treaties’ laissez-faire liberalism is a possible factor 
influencing EU investment policies. While individual Member States may be reluctant to 
abandon their tried-and-tested ways,  the EU has already expressed its support for the right to 
regulate in a number of recent documents, including a European Parliament Resolution of 
2011 and, reportedly, the Council’s negotiating directives authorizing negotiations of 
investment chapters in comprehensive agreements with, in a first step, Canada, India and 
Singapore and, later, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. Although in its July 2012 
document the Commission seems to draw a line between investment liberalization and 
investment protection, it has upheld the compatibility of both with the right to regulate and 
has suggested that an explicit reservation of policy space would contribute to a higher degree 
of consistency and predictability of arbitral awards.  
 
This would reflect the Commission’s past approach, namely that EU FTAs, as well as EU 
political framework agreements, have espoused concern regarding parties’ regulatory 
discretion. The embedded liberalism of these treaties, à la WTO, is evident in their 
significant regulatory language, found in the form of preamble statements, provisions on the 
non-relaxation of environmental and labor standards, respect for democracy and human rights 
(in the EU framework agreements) and, importantly, exceptions for the protection of the 
parties’ essential security interests; in this light, these treaties appear to adopt a nuanced 
rhetoric of economic liberalization, desirous of achieving a middle ground between the 
promotion of trade liberalization and making allowances for regulatory action in the public 
interest. The Commission seems to be inclined to continue this approach in its investment 
treaties, as it addresses questions related to the right to regulate.  
 
With negotiations of the first EU investment agreements ongoing, it is of course not possible 
to reflect on these developments with any finality. But, to all intents and purposes, a new 
European treaty model appears to be taking root -- a model that, for the first time in Europe, 
will address the state parties’ regulatory concerns, as well as incorporate investment 
protection at the pre-establishment stage. Its possible greater convergence with the North 
American model would contribute to a more uniform approach on both sides of the Atlantic, 
and may even facilitate the conclusion of a prospective multilateral investment agreement in 
the future. Whatever the reasons behind this policy reappraisal, whether or not linked to the 
influence of trade agreements or disillusionment with the Washington Consensus, the 
political context in which EU investment policy is being elaborated or the guiding principles 
of the EU’s external action, investment law stands at the threshold of a new generation of 
investment agreements -- at least in Europe. If this is a paradigm shift, it may just be the right 
one. 
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